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Abstract
This thesis investigate whether substantial illegal insider trading occurs prior to mergers
& acquisitions (M&A) and seasoned equity offerings (SEO) on Oslo Stock Exchange. By
examining stock price dynamics prior to the public announcements of these transactions,
we investigate whether there are any abnormalities, indicating illegal insider trading. Our
initial findings show a significant buildup in cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) of
4.8 % for the M&A sample. The SEOs are divided by the issuers ex ante stated intended
use of proceeds, and we find that approximately half of the total buildup in CAR occurs
prior to the public announcement for recapitalization motivated offerings. Furthermore, we
examine whether these findings are a result of illegal insider trading or rumors and market
anticipation. We introduce Google search volume as a measure of investor attention.
High investor attention suggests a degree of rumors and market anticipation about the
upcoming event. We find that the pre-announcement buildup in CAR for the M&A sample
is mainly driven by rumors about the upcoming event. However, we cannot attribute
the same effect to the recapitalization offerings. Finally, we examine whether there are
any deal- and firm specific variables that can explain the pre-announcement cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) through a cross-sectional regression analysis. We find that for
the M&A sample, Google search volume seems to the most important variable, however
for the recapitalization offerings, leverage and profitability appears to explain some of
the variation in CAR. Summarized, we find no evidence of illegal insider trading prior
to M&A announcements, however our results indicate that there might be some illegal
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1 Introduction
In the Norwegian Security Trading Act from 20071, a continuation of the law from 1997,
paragraph § 3-3 clearly states that trading on insider information is illegal. In §21-3 it
is further specified that violations of Norwegian Security Trading Act § 3-3 can lead to
fines and/or prison of up to six years. Nevertheless, there are seen different violations of
these laws in the last years. For instance, 18th of September 2013 the Norwegian Supreme
Court sentenced a broker firm employee to prison for three years2. He possessed case
sensitive information that a contract of oil extraction in Iraq was invalid and that DNO
would be blacklisted by central authorities in Bagdad. Regardless, he uttered at the table
of brokers:
“A good tip, guys: Short DNO. Short DNO now”.
The person also recommended one of his customers to short sell the DNO stock, in which
the customer immediately shorted 500 000 shares and bought and sold shares in the
company for a total of NOK 85 million that day. Professor and scientist in financial crime,
Petter Gottschalk, has throughout the years repeatedly claimed that there is a substantial
degree of illegal insider trading at Oslo Stock Exchange. When four individuals were
accused of illegal insider trading in 2008, Petter Gottschalk further stated: “this is just the
tip of the iceberg”. After talking to Gottshalk this fall, he argues that there still is a lot
of illegal insider trading at the Exchange, as Økokrim3 does not sufficiently follow up on
the issue due to previous failures in court. Also, he mentiones that the exchange does not
have sufficient material to provide evidence on illegal insider trading. If Petter Gottschalk
is right and there still is a substantial problem, it affects many aspects of trading. For
instance Dimitri Vayanos, professor of Finance at London School of Economics, stated
in 2004 that given information asymmetry at the exchange, international investors will
hesitate to invest at Oslo Stock Exchange. The reduced liquidity further raise the cost of
capital for the companies which in turn drives the stock prices down4. We believe these
implications are severe. There is limited research concerning illegal insider trading from
a financial perspective in Norway. We believe the issue of illegal insider trading at the
1https://lovdata.no/dokument/LTI/lov/2007-06-29-75
2https://www.domstol.no/globalassets/upload/hret/avgjorelser/2013/saknr2013- 821anonymisert.pdf
3The central unit for investigation and prosecution of financial crime in Norway
4https://www.dagensperspektiv.no/oslo-b%C3%B8rs-blir-ikke-kvitt-innsidestempelet
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Oslo Stock Exchange is an important topic, and consequently we will investigate the issue
further.
In this thesis we conduct an empirical investigation on the possibility of illegal insider
trading activity prior to the public announcement of Mergers & Acqusitions (M&A) and
Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO). To gain insight into the existence of illegal insider
trading on Oslo Stock Exchange, we follow the Event-Study methodology, presented by
MacKinlay (1997). Using data on 405 successful M&A- and SEO transactions from 2000-
2019, we derive the abnormal returns prior to the public announcements of these deals.
Following Keown and Pinkerton (1981) we use the cumulative average abnormal returns
(CAR) prior to the public announcements, as a measure of illegal insider trading, before
we examine whether there are other factors that can explain the abnormal performance.
Consistent with existing literature on foreign markets, we find a significant build-up in
average abnormal returns of 4.8 % for M&As, during an event window of 25 days preceding
the announcement.
Following Autore et al. (2009) and Silva and Bilinski (2015) we divide the SEO transactions
into three categories; Investments, General and Recapitalisation, based on their ex-ante
stated intended use of proceeds. Investment and General motivated SEOs experience
significant cumulative abnormal returns of 4.0 % and 6.5 % respectively. However, upon
disclosure of the deal, the market reacts in the opposite direction. Since previous research
find evidence of a negative market reaction to seasoned equity offerings (Masulis and
Korwar, 1986), we expect illegal insider traders to short sell rather than to buy the stock.
Hence, the potential illegal insider trading does not lead the direction of the abnormal
returns and the effect is difficult to isolate. SEOs within the category Recapitalisation
experience a highly significant cumulative abnormal return of -9.1 % during the event
window. This means that approximately half of the total development in CAR occurs
prior to the announcement.
Some existing literature interpret significant build-up in CAR as de facto evidence of illegal
insider trading (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981). However, this thesis aims to distinguish
between actual illegal insider trading and trading based on rumors or market anticipation.
The difference between trading based on public and private information can be hard to
uncover. Our main challenge is to find a suitable direct measure of investor attention. In
3
previous research, several indirect proxies for investor attention such as trading volume
(Gervais et al., 2001; Gao and Oler, 2004) and news media (Jarrell and Paulson, 1989; Jain
and Sunderman, 2014) are used. News articles are indirect measures of investor attention
as the investor only pays attention to the article if she reads it. In the informational
age, most information is only some clicks away. Thus, it is difficult to identify what the
investor actually pays attention to. Kahneman (1973) suggested already in 1973 that
attention is a scarce resource. Furthermore, Simon (1971) wrote that: “What information
consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence, a wealth of
information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention efficiently
among the overabundance of information sources...”. From a study done by Bohn and
Short (2009) at the University of California, they found that the average American in
2008 consumed about 34 gigabytes of data and information each day. This is calculated
to an increase of 350 % from 1980 to 2008, which by Herbert Simon’s quote should lead to
a poverty of attention. We thus believe we need to employ a direct measure of attention.
Da et al. (2011) argues that Google search volume represents a direct measure. They
claim that if an investor searches for a company on Google, he definitely pays attention to
it. Da et al. (2011) find that this measure is correlated with, but different than existing
proxies of investor attention. In addition, it captures investor attention in a more timely
fashion than other proxies. Thus, in this thesis we contribute to the existing literature
on illegal insider trading by employing Google search volume as a measure of investor
attention. We also include trading volume as a robustness.
When we adjust for abnormal search volume prior to the public announcements of our
sample events, we observe that the build-up in CAR almost completely disappears in the
M&A sample. This indicates that the significant pre-announcement CAR can be driven
by rumors and market anticipation rather than illegal insider trading. However, when
applying the same methodology to the recapitalisation motivated SEOs, we find that
the build-up in CAR prevails. This result suggests that we cannot explain the negative
pre-announcement build-up by rumors and market anticipation.
Furthermore, we test the cumulative abnormal return for firms within the M&A and
Recapitalisation category, for other firm- and deal-specific variables. Consistent with our
previous findings, we find that Google search volume explains much of the variation in
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CAR for the M&As, when we perform a cross-sectional regression analysis. Through
the cross-sectional regression analysis for the Recapitalisation offerings, however, we find
that firm specific variables such as leverage ratio and return on assets, are the most
significant factors in explaining the variation in CAR. This result provides less strength
to the argument of illegal insider trading in this category.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows; In Section 2 we review the existing
literature relevant for this topic. Section 3 describes the data and the sample selection
criteria. Section 4 presents the methodology used to derive CAR and Abnormal Google
search, as well as the cross-sectional regression analysis. In Section 5 we present and
discuss the empirical results from our analysis. Section 6 concludes the thesis and discuss
topics for further research.
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2 Literature Review
There has been a number of studies investigating illegal insider trading over the past
decades. Most of them indicate that illegal insider trading occurs, and insiders earn
abnormal returns prior to relevant public announcements. There is, however, limited
research into the illegal insider trading activity on Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). In addition,
this paper utilizes the overflow of information, that the Internet provides, to distinguish
between actual illegal insider trading and trading based on rumors and market anticipation.
Analyzing a sample of 194 successfully acquired firms on the New York and American
stock exchanges, Keown and Pinkerton (1981) found a substantial buildup in cumulative
average abnormal returns prior to merger announcements. Approximately half of the total
increase in CAR occurs prior to the announcement date, paralleled by a dramatic increase
in trading volume. The existence of abnormal returns for target companies prior to public
merger announcements are further supported by Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992) and King
(2009). Keown and Pinkerton (1981) take these results as de-facto evidence of illegal
insider trading on the American stock exchanges. Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggest,
however, that this run-up simply reflect the market’s anticipation of an impending bid.
Our paper suggest that there exists a pre-announcement buildup in CAR for target firms
of M&As on the OSE, consistent with previous research in other countries.
The literature regarding the illegal insider trading activity before public announcements
of seasoned equity offerings (SEO) is more limited. However, announcement of an equity
offering is empirically correlated with price changes (Lucas and McDonald, 1990); hence
insiders have an incentive to trade on their private information. Moreover, Karpoff and
Lee (1991) found that an unusual amount of registered insiders sell stock before an
announcement of equity offerings, implying that insiders are willing to trade on their
superior information prior to common stock offerings. Jung et al. (1996) divides firms
based on their investment motives and finds evidence that firms with poor investment
motives experience a significant drop in share price after an offerings announcement.
Moreover, Autore et al. (2009) divides SEOs based on their stated intended use of
proceeds. They find evidence of significant long-run under-performance by issuers that
stated debt repayment or general corporate purposes as their intended use of proceeds,
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while those with investment motives did not experience a significant under-performance.
These results are supported in a study by Silva and Bilinski (2015) who finds evidence of
a cumulative abnormal return of 2.7 % for issuers stating investment motives in a 5-day
event window surrounding the announcement. The cumulative abnormal return in the
same event window for issuers stating general corporate purposes and recapitalisation
purposes was -3.2 % and -3.3 % respectively. Following these papers, we have classified
the SEO by their intended use of proceeds. Similar to Autore et al. (2009), our results
provide evidence that offerings motivated by recapitalisation purposes exhibit negative
abnormal returns on average in the days prior to the announcement. However, we find a
positive pre-announcement cumulative abnormal return for firms stating investment or
general corporate purposes as their intended use of proceeds.
One of the main challenges when the stock price exhibits abnormal characteristics prior
to an announcement, is to assess whether the abnormal characteristics are a result of
market anticipation, other confounding factors or illegal insider trading. Often rumors
about an upcoming takeover or SEO arise before the company publicly announce its plans.
Hence, some of the cumulative abnormal return that can be observed prior to a public
announcement can be attributed to these rumors. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) argue that
much of the trading preceding announcements can be attributed to a well-functioning
market rather than illegal insider trading. Their study analyze 172 target firms listed on
American stock exchanges. They found that the target firms experienced a significant
stock-price runup and surges in volume before the announcements, supporting previous
research. However, the presence of rumors in the news media was found to be the strongest
variable in explaining unanticipated premiums and pre-announcement runup. Building
on the aforementioned research Jain and Sunderman (2014) examined the existence of
informed trading in the Indian market from 1996-2010. Adjusting for a significant media
speculation variable, they found evidence of illegal insider trading.
In our paper we base the existence of pre-announcement rumors on the Google search
volume on the different companies in the sample. Similar to Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), we
find that much of the buildup in cumulative abnormal return prior to the announcements
can be attributed to market anticipation. When we examine a subsample with the CAR
of the companies with the least search volume, the runup in CAR completely disappears
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for target firms in a takeover. However, when we look at the buildup prior to SEOs where
the stated intended use of proceeds is recapitalization, the CAR prevails regardless of
search volume, indicating the existence of illegal insider trading.
The use of Google search volume as a measure of market anticipation was first introduced
by Da et al. (2011). In their paper they used a sample of 3000 stocks and found that
the Google search volume Index (SVI) captured the investor attention in a more timely
fashion. They also found that the SVI was correlated but different from existing proxies of
investor attention (e.g News Media). These findings are further supported by Fricke et al.
(2014) who found that the SVI predicts stock market reactions to earnings announcement.
In our initial data on Google Search Volumes we often observe a large spike in searches at
the announcement date, which support the findings of Da et al. (2011) and Fricke et al.
(2014) that Google search volume capture investor attention in a timely fashion.
Eckbo and Ødegaard (2020) is, to our knowledge, the only other study investigating
illegal insider trading on OSE from a financial perspective. Their study analyze insider
trades on OSE between 1986-2016, to test for gender-based differences in risk aversion
and access to inside information. Using portfolios with weights constructed to reflect
insiders’ stock-holdings, they find no evidence of abnormal insider performance, suggesting
a low degree of illegal insider trading. However, Seyhun (1986) argues that insiders are
not expected to trade for their own account prior to possible profitable corporate events.
While Eckbo and Ødegaard (2020) argue that insiders does not succeed in "Buying low
and selling high", our results indicate that there might be illegal insider trading activity
prior to Recapitalisation offerings5. Following the argument of Seyhun (1986), this might
indicate that registered insiders trade through different accounts on OSE, to hide the
possible illegal action.
The topic of illegal insider trading is well documented in the previous literature. There
is, however, less research regarding both seasoned equity offerings and the Norwegian
market. In addition, this paper contributes to the existing literature by adding Google
search volume as a measure of rumors and market anticipation. In the following section
we describe the data used in the subsequent analysis.
5It should be mentioned that Eckbo and Ødegaard (2020) only look at primary insiders such as CEOs
and board members. On the other hand, in our definition of insiders we include other stakeholders with
insider information such as investment bank employees helping with a transaction.
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3 Data
In this section we provide a detailed description of how we obtained our data, as
well as descriptive dataset information. We utilize different databases to obtain data
throughout the study. To identify mergers and acquisitions we use the Thomson Reuters
SDCPlatinumTM database, as it is regarded as a highly reliable database on M&A
activity (Barnes et al., 2014). Following Hertzel and Li (2010) and Yang et al. (2016)
we also apply the SDC database for information concerning the SEOs. Furthermore, we
utilize Amadeus 3.0 to collect data from the Børsprojektet NHH database to collect firm
specific data. Market benchmarks are collected from Ødegaard’s website6 describing asset
pricing data on Oslo Stock Exchange. To acquire data on company web search activity
we obtain data from the Google Trends7 database.
3.1 Sample Selection Criteria
The initial deal specific information on M&A and equity offerings are obtained from
SDC PlatinumTM . The information include firm- and deal specific information such
as market capitalization and announcement dates. We manually obtain data from the
financial statements of the firms when there is limited firm-specific data provided by
the SDC database. For both the M&A- and the SEO deals we manually cross-check
the announcement dates using Newsweb8. We also use this cite to obtain information
regarding the intended use of proceeds from the offering.
Following Betton et al. (2008) and Bessembinder and Zhang (2013) we impose two filters
to the M&As. First, the takeover must be categorized as a merger (M), acquisition of
majority interest (AM), acquisition of remaining interest (AR) or acquisition of partial
interest (AP). Second, the acquisition must lead to control over the target firm. More
specifically this implies that the acquirer owns less than 50 % of the target firm prior to
the acquisition and holds more than 50 % post-acquisition. To avoid small deals that are
less likely to have material impact on stock returns, we filter out deals were less than 5 %
6Bernt Arne Ødegaard - Retrieved from:
http://finance.bi.no/ bernt/financial_data/ose_asset_pricing_data/index.html
7Retrieved from: https://trends.google.com
8Newsweb is the official source of information on publicly listed companies on Oslo Stock Exchange.
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of shares were acquired in the transaction (Bessembinder and Zhang, 2013). Furthermore,
we exclude M&A- and SEO transactions based on the following criteria:
1. Geographic location – We start by filtering on geographic location. We include only
SEOs were the issuing firm is Norwegian. Similarly, the target firm of the M&A
transaction is constrained to Norwegian companies only.
2. Time span – The period of the analysis is set from 01.01.2000 - 31.12.2019. We
choose this period to achieve a balance between robust- and sufficient observations.
We exclude earlier observations due to low availability in stock data prior to year
2000.
3. Public status – In this paper we utilize data on publicly traded firms in the period
prior to M&A- or SEO announcements. We thus remove all M&As and offerings
that are not related to an already publicly traded firm. We remove all observations
concerning firms that are privately traded, in addition to all initial public offerings
(IPO).
4. Deal size – Following Bessembinder and Zhang (2013) and Mola and Loughran (2004)
we set a minimum deal size on the M&As and SEOs respectively. Bessembinder
and Zhang (2013) set a USD 5 million minimum deal restriction on the M&As,
while Mola and Loughran (2004) set a USD 25 million restriction on the analyzed
SEOs. These are restrictions based on a sample of American firms. The deal sizes
in Norway are relatively smaller, and we set the lower deal size restrictions on both
M&As and offerings to USD 2 million. We are now left with 273 M&As and 643
offerings.
5. Merkur Market and Oslo Axess – We filter out M&As and offerings from firms listed
on Merkur Market and Oslo Axess due to limited or insufficient transaction data.
61 M&A observations and 136 equity offerings are removed.
6. Repair offerings - When an issuing company contemplate a private placement, they
can choose to hold a subsequent repair offering for the existing shareholders that
did not participate in the primary offering, to avoid dilution. We do not include
these in the sample due to the noise it can create, as the repair offering is often
announced together with the original private placement. In addition, the original
10 3.2 Intended Use of Proceeds
offering might bias the estimation window of the repair offering. 84 observations are
removed. We are left with 423 seasoned equity offerings.
7. Inadequate data - We also exclude deals with missing or uncertain data. Following
Keown and Pinkerton (1981), we use 126 trading days prior to the announcement date
for each observation in our analysis. There are 50 M&A- and 92 SEO observations
with missing price data, and they are thus removed. Finally, the certainty of
announcement dates is the foundation of our analysis. In 33 and 48 occasions there
are minor uncertainties on the actual announcement days for the M&A- and SEO
observations respectively. These observations are thus excluded. Also, following
Autore et al. (2009), 7 offerings are excluded due to intended use of proceeds
classification ambiguity.
Our main sample consists of 129 M&As and 276 seasoned equity offerings. However, we
will add further constraints to the sample as we delve deeper into the analysis.
3.2 Intended Use of Proceeds
With our main sample we further divide the different secondary equity offerings into
categories given their ex ante stated intended use of proceeds, following existing literature
(see Autore et al., 2009; Silva and Belinski, 2015). Existing literature split the SEOs
into three main categories: Investment, General and Refinancing/Recapitalisation. The
observations that are classified as Investment explicitly state in the announcement that
the use of proceeds will be used for investment purposes such as acquisitions, operational
assets or investments in new projects. The second category, General, refers to offerings
where the intended use of proceeds is used for general corporate purposes and to improve
the working capital position. In the last category, Recapitalisation, we include the SEOs
where the company needs to restructure and/or pay down existing outstanding debt.
Following Autore et al. (2009), we remove observations that both mention investments and
repayment of debt to avoid ambiguity. We provide examples of intended use of proceeds
classification in Appendix A2.
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3.3 Data Sample
Our main sample consists of 129 M&As, 131 Investment offerings, 74 General offerings
and 71 Recapitalisation. In Figure 1 we present an overview of how our main sample of
405 observations are split across time and deal type. We also include the OSEBX-index
over the sample period 2000-2019. From our dataset, we see clear trends in deal types
due to different market conditions throughout the years. Prior to the financial crisis in
2008, most of the observations are M&As and Investments. We consistently observe a
peak in Recapitalisations in 2009, following the financial crisis.
Figure 1: Number of deals across time and deal type
Note: The chart illustrate the number of observations in the main sample split by deal type and across
time (lhs). The main sample is divided into M&As and SEOs. The SEOs are further divided according
to the intended use of proceeds into the categories Investment, General and Recapitalisation. We also
include the OSEBX-index (rhs) as an indication of the general market condition.
We collected industry specific information from the SDC database on both the M&A
targets and the SEOs. The SDC platform divided our dataset into 43 different industry
categories. Due to many similar industry categorizations, we manually went through the
categories and used the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS)9 as a foundation
to create an industry composition of 9 industries. An overview of the categorization
9Global Industry Classification Standard is a global classification system for listed companies, developed
by MSCI and S&P (Oslo Børs, 2020)
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across industry and deal type is presented in Table 1. From the table, we can extract
that 56 % of the technology deals were M&As, while 29 % of the observations from
the Shipping/transportation industry were Recapitalisations. The percentage share of
Recapitalisations is greatest in the Real Estate/Property industry (43 %). However,
there are only 14 observations in our sample from this industry. From Table 1, we see
that more than half of our 405 deals are in the industries Oil & Gas, Technology and
Shipping/Transportation. We include information concerning the dataset across time and
industry as we employ these factors as explanatory variables in the cross-sectional analysis
in section 5.4.
Table 1: Observations split by industry and deal type
Industry M&A Investment General Recapitalisation Total
Panel A: Number of observations across industry and observation type
Oil & Gas 14 35 11 14 74
Technology 45 21 8 6 80
Shipping/Transportation 20 18 4 17 59
Consumer Products 18 4 6 5 33
Finance & Insurance 7 11 19 4 41
Utility & Energy 4 12 4 5 25
Healthcare 3 12 11 4 30
Real Estate/Property 4 2 2 6 14
Other 14 16 9 10 49
Total 129 131 74 71 405
Panel B: % of observations in industry split by deal type
Oil & Gas 19 % 47 % 15 % 19 % 100 %
Technology 56 % 26 % 10 % 8 % 100 %
Shipping/Transportation 34 % 31 % 7 % 29 % 100 %
Consumer Products 55 % 12 % 18 % 15 % 100 %
Finance & Insurance 17 % 27 % 46 % 10 % 100 %
Utility & Energy 16 % 48 % 16 % 20 % 100 %
Healthcare 10 % 40 % 37 % 13 % 100 %
Real Estate/Property 29 % 14 % 14 % 43 % 100 %
Other 29 % 33 % 18 % 20 % 100 %
Total 32 % 32 % 18 % 18 % 100 %
Note: In Panel A we present the number of deals across deal type and industry. The main sample
is split into the deal type categories M&A, Investment, General and Recapitalisation. We also
divide the sample into nine industries based on GICS. In Panel B we provide the deal-type split
in to each of the 9 industries.
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3.4 Google Search Volume
Based on the results from the first part of our analysis, we find it necessary to collect
Google search data on the M&As and the SEOs classified as Recapitalisation. We manually
obtain the data from the Google Trends website. Google Trends provides a time series
index of the search volume for different user queries. It uses a standardized relative scale
from 0 to 100, where the period with the most searches take the value 100, a period with
half as much searches takes the value 50 and so forth (Choi and Varian, 2012).
The existing literature differ somewhat on how to identify the different companies. Bijl
et al. (2016) find that company name search activity is stronger related to stock market
returns than ticker searches. Also, when searching for tickers, we experience frequent error
messages on our search. These findings combined leads us to search for company name.
While searching for a firm, Google Trends often identifies the search term as a company.
For instance, if one search for REC Silicon, Google Trends will identify this as a company
and filter out searches not related to the firm. We choose this filter were there is adequate
data. Regular search term is applied otherwise.
Furthermore, we choose to only include searches that are done in Norway. Preis et al.
(2013) find that data filtered according to geographical location is better able to explain
stock movements in these locations.
Google Trends provides data in different time intervals. We utilize the customized time-
period where we choose data for the trading days period (-126,0). This means that we
obtain between 175-195 regular days on each observation. For instance, we collect Google
Trends data on REC Silicon from 8th of October 2018 to the announcement 9th of April
2019. We choose this period to be able to compute a normalized- and abnormal search
volume for each stock. There is also possible to obtain weekly data for the same period.
However, for the precision of the analysis, we do not include this data. The weekly data
will create noise as; 1) the week is defined from Sunday to Sunday and 2) and we expect
the price run-ups/downs to happen over a limited amount of trading days.
Google Trends provides the opportunity to apply different search filters, such as a Finance.
Bijl et al. (2016) found that the Finance filter does not yield any improvement compared
to search for all categories when predicting stock returns. Thus, we do not apply any such
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filters when retrieving the data.
Finally, we are left with 90 M&As and 63 Recapitalisations of the total 129 (30.2 %
missing values) and 71 (11.3 %) observations respectively. There are a greater number of
missing values in the M&A sample relative to the Recapitalisation sample due to more
takeovers in the period were Google Trend data is unobtainable (2000-2003).
Examples of Google Trends raw data on 4 different companies are provided in Figure 2.
We include these charts as they provide important insights. We observe that the search
volume spikes at the announcement date for the different firms, which we consistently
find throughout our sample. This is what we would expect from an accurate measure of
investor attention. Although we cannot say that Google Trends is a perfect measure, the
data indicates that Google Trends is able to capture investor attention in a timely fashion.
Figure 2: Google Trends raw data
Note: The graphs present examples of daily Google trends raw data for sample firms over the estimation-
and event window (-126,0). The Google Search Volume Index is a relative scale stretching from 0-100,
where the value 100 is applied to the day with most searches relative to the other observations in the
search period. A day with half as much searches takes the value 50 and so forth. Days with close to zero
searches relative to the other observations takes the value 0.
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4 Methodology
In this section we describe the methodology we applied to investigate the degree of illegal
insider trading on Oslo Stock Exchange prior to M&A- and SEO announcements. In
order to measure the effects of these announcements we apply the standard Event Study
methodology. Using this methodology, we start by defining the appropriate windows of
interest and derive the abnormal announcement return from these.
4.1 Abnormal Announcement Return
An event study is usually used in the literature to measure the impact of an event on the
value of the firm (MacKinlay, 1997). The rationale behind such a study is that, given that
the semi-strong form of efficient market hypothesis is correct, the effects of an event will
immediately be reflected in security prices (Fama, 1970). Following Keown and Pinkerton
(1981) we select the date of the public announcement as the event date (t=0) for both
M&As and SEOs. Further, daily closing stock prices were collected for 157 trading days
surrounding the event date, with 126 trading days before the event and 30 trading days
after. Following Keown and Pinkerton (1981) we use an estimation window of 101 trading
days (-126,-26) prior to the event window to estimate normal returns and use a 27-day
event window (-25, 1). To eliminate bias in the estimation of normal returns we make sure
that the estimation window and the event window does not overlap. This is to prevent
event-driven effects from interfering in the calculation of normal returns (MacKinlay,
1997). A timeline with the time sequence is illustrated below.
Figure 3: Event Study Timeline
In this study we are interested in the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the event
window. Following standard event study methodology presented by MacKinlay (1997),
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we calculate CAR as the cumulative difference between actual returns and estimated
normal returns (expected return without the event). In order to calculate the normal
return, we use the one-factor market model. Holler (2012) found this model most accurate
when calculating normal returns. We use OLS regression to regress excess returns of each
sample stock on the excess return of the market. Since the industry composition in our
sample reflects the total industry composition on the Oslo Stock Exchange, we use the
returns from the Oslo Børs All-Share Index (OSEAX) as the market portfolio return.
Estimating normal returns
For each sample security the normal return is calculated, where the model￿s linear
specification follows an assumed joint normality of asset return (MacKinlay, 1997). For
each security i we calculate the following:
Rit = ↵i +  iRmt + ✏it (1)
E(✏it) = 0 and var(✏it) =  2✏t
where ↵i and  i are the intercept and slope respectively of the linear relationship between
the securities return and the market portfolio return. Rit is the actual return in excess of
risk-free rate of stock i on day t, and Rmt is the return on OSEAX in excess of risk-free
rate on day t.
This paper mainly relies on the one-factor model as method for the estimation of “normal
returns”. However, for robustness we also calculate expected returns were we include two
additional factors, using the Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993).
By applying this model, the “normal returns” are calculated as follows:
Rit = ↵i +  i(MKTt) + si(SMBt) + hi(HMLt) + ✏it (2)
Rit is the actual return in excess of the risk-free rate, MKT is the excess return on the
Oslo Børs All-Share index, SMB is the average return on a portfolio long small market
capitalization securities and short big market capitalization securities. HML is the average
return on a portfolio long high book-to-market stocks and short low book-to-market stocks.
Estimating abnormal return
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Following Keown and Pinkerton (1981) we use the estimated ↵̂i and  ̂i to calculate the
abnormal returns for each security within the event window (-25,1). The abnormal returns
for each security are given by:
ARi⌧ = Ri⌧   ↵̂i    ̂iRm⌧ (3)
where ↵̂i and  ̂i are the ordinary least squares estimates of ↵i and  i.
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR)
In order to draw overall inference for the events, the abnormal return needs to be
aggregated. The cumulative abnormal return is calculated by aggregating the abnormal
returns of the individual stock through time. We thus accommodate a multiple period





Average abnormal return (AR)
The abnormal return for each observation are averaged across observations at each period







Cumulative average abnormal return (CAR)
The average abnormal returns from the equation above is then aggregated over the event





Statistical tests are further conducted in order to determine if the abnormal and cumulative
abnormal returns prior to the announcement are equal to zero. We have utilized a variety
of both parametric and non-parametric tests to examine whether this hypothesis is true.
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A description of these tests follows in Appendix A1.
4.2 Abnormal Trading Volume
In this study we utilize the abnormal trading volume prior to the announcement of an M&A
or SEO. The methodology behind the estimation of abnormal trading volume follows the
same event study methodology described in Section 4.1. In this paper, trading volume is
measured as the percentage of outstanding shares traded on a given day. Previous research
suggest that raw trading volume is highly non-normal, but that a log-transformation
yields measures that are approximately normally distributed (Ajinkya and Jain, 1989).





where ni,t denotes the number of shares traded on day t and Si,t the number of shares
outstanding for security i on day t. In order to calculate the abnormal trading volume
preceding the announcements we applied a mean-adjusted model. The expected trading
volume is calculated as the mean trading volume over the estimation window. The model
can be written as follows:
AVi,t = Vi,t   Vi,t (8)







In the equation above T denotes the number of days in the estimation period, which is
the same as for abnormal returns, 101 days.
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4.3 Abnormal Google Search Volume
To distinguish between market anticipation and actual illegal insider trading this paper
applies data from Google Trends as a measure of investor attention. We investigate
whether there is any abnormal search volume in the days preceding a public announcement.
Abnormal search volumes in the days prior to an announcement suggest that there is
leakage of rumors about the upcoming event, hence justifies a possible price runup. To
estimate the expected search volume and subsequent abnormal search volume, this study
relies on a mean-adjusted model. Following Bijl et al. (2016) and Da et al. (2011), we
calculate the abnormal search volume as follows:
ASV Ii,t = SV Ii,t   SV Ii,t (10)
where, SV Ii,t is the Google search volume for security i at day t, ASV Iit is the abnormal







T denotes the number of days in the estimation window, which remains the same as for
abnormal returns and abnormal volume, 101 days.
After the computation of abnormal search volume for each security within the event
window, we calculate the average abnormal search volume for each security. We further
distinguish between high- and low search firms, separated on the median observation.
4.4 Cross-sectional Regression
Based on the initial findings, we perform a cross-sectional regression analysis on the
M&A- and Recapitalisation samples. We use ordinary least squares (OLS) for coefficient
estimates to our variables described in the subsequent subsection. Following MacKinlay
(1997) we perform the regression:
CARi =  0 +  1x,1i + ...+  Mx,Mi+ ✏i (12)
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given the sample of N observations and M features, where CARi is the cumulative
abnormal return of the ith observation. The  s are the coefficient of the variables, while
the ✏i is the error term, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with the variable and to
have a mean of zero. MacKinlay (1997) reasons that heteroscedastic standard errors are
expected when an event study is conducted. We provide heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors, following the approach of White (1980).
4.4.1 Explanatory Variables
We include different explanatory variables in our cross-sectional analysis. This section
seeks to address the rationale behind the inclusion of some of the variables. We examine
previous empirical research on the topics M&A and SEO to obtain relevant explanatory
variables for our cross-sectional analysis. The main ambition for the cross-sectional analysis
on our M&A sample is to investigate if the Google Search Binary variable High ASVI
remains significant when including other explanatory variables. In our Recapitalisation
cross-sectional regression analysis, more attention is directed to other factors that might
explain the plunge in CAR prior to the offering announcements.
Google Trends ASVI is the main indicator variable we want to research further in the
M&A regressions. In section 5.3 we elaborate on why Google search volume can be a
useful, direct measure of investor attention.
In our Recapitalisation-regressions we examine whether the type of flotation method can
explain some of the negative development in CAR prior to the announcement dates. Both
Eckbo et al. (2007) and Bortolotti et al. (2008) find that Private Placements on average
offer higher returns than other flotation methods (i.e. Rights issues) at announcement.
Moreover, we control for deal specific variables such as Number of Bidders, Acquirer nation
and Relative Deal Size. The reasoning behind the inclusion of the former, is that different
bids can potentially lead to more news prior to the announcement. It is important to
notice that the Google Trends variable and number of bidders both potentially address
rumor effects. This can cause multicollinarity to the model. However, as the correlation
between the two variables are low (0.043, see Appendix A3), we include both. We also
include the binary variable Acquirer nation to investigate whether a foreign acquirer
has any implications on the pre-announcement CAR. We further include a variable for
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Relative Deal Size, as the adverse selection model suggest that larger equity offerings are
associated with unfavourable market reactions.
We also add the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm as an explanatory
variable in both the M&A (target firm)- and Recapitalisation regressions. We believe
this is an important variable to include, as it describes the size of the firm (measured in
valuation metric). We have calculated the abnormal returns based on the market model,
and therefore we want to adjust for the additional risk of smaller firms and corresponding
higher expected returns (Fama and French, 1993).
We include the book-to-market ratio (B2M) as an indicator variable identifying the
valuation prospects of the target firm in the M&A sample and the issuing firm in the
Recapitalisation sample. With rational pricing, high book-to-market signals persistent
poor earnings while a low book-to-market ratio indicate strong earnings (Fama and French,
1995). As we employ the market model to calculate abnormal returns, we include the
book-to-market ratio to adjust for the findings of Fama and French (1995). The book-
to-market ratio is retrieved from the SDC-platform and based on Last Twelve Months
(LTM) book values and market value prior to announcement date.
We include an explanation variable for how levered each firm is. The ratio is based on
total debt divided by total assets. The numbers are gathered from both the SDC database





We believe this variable is especially interesting in the cross-sectional regression on the
recapitalisation sample as one might suspect the negative development in CAR prior to
the announcement to be caused by investors anticipating that a subsequent offering is
inevitable.
Another interesting explanatory variable that we include, is the pre-announcement return
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We include the ratio as an explanatory variable to investigate if the buildup in CAR can
be explained by the profitability of the firm.
4.5 Methodology Limitations
The event-study methodology can be useful in several ways, when assessing the impact
of an event on the valuation of a firm. However, the methodology rely on assumptions
that may not hold in all circumstances. We will in this section briefly discuss some of the
limitations of the event study methodology.
Firstly, the choice of model to estimate expected returns may have a bearing impact on
the significance and magnitude of our results. In order to test the robustness of abnormal
returns, we estimate normal returns using multiple estimation models.
Secondly, in accordance with MacKinlay (1997) we experience increasing variance when
testing our null hypothesis that CAR equals zero. Boehmer et al. (1991) argue that the
null-hypothesis is wrongly rejected too often, due to the event induced variance. To adjust
for this issue, we apply the standardized cross-sectional test introduced by Boehmer et al.
(1991).
Finally, when we analyze the aggregated abnormal returns, we assume that the abnormal
returns of the different securities are independent. However, overlap in the event window
in calendar time, introduce a problem of cross sectional dependence. This means that
the covariance between the abnormal returns of the different securities are different from
zero (MacKinlay, 1997). MacKinlay (1997) suggests different accommodations to deal
with the clustering problem. We use one of these accommodations, namely to aggregate
the abnormal returns into a portfolio, dated using event time. Also, we perform the test
introduced by Boehmer et al. (1991). They conclude, from their simulations, that the
results of their standardized cross-sectional test are essentially unaffected by the presence
of event-date clustering (Boehmer et al., 1991).
In the subsequent section we apply the methodology, described in this section, on the
sample data. Furthermore, we present the results from our analysis and discuss these in
the context of economically relevant theories.
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In this section, we report the results from our analysis of illegal insider trading on Oslo
Stock Exchange. First, we show that there is a significant buildup in CAR prior to M&A-
and SEO announcements in our sample. Second, we distinguish between buildup driven
by possible illegal insider trading and buildup in CAR that can be explained by rumors
about an upcoming event. Finally, we perform a cross-sectional regression analysis to
examine whether firm- and deal specific variables can explain the variation in CAR.
5.1 Event Study Results
The common method for assessing illegal insider trading in the existing literature, is to
calculate the buildup in CAR in the days prior to a public announcement (see Keown and
Pinkerton, 1981; Sanders and Zdanowic, 1992). This gives us the following hypothesis:
H0 : CAR = 0
HA : CAR 6= 0
To test this hypothesis, we applied the event study methodology described in the previous
section. When calculating the CAR, we distinguish between M&As and the three SEO
classifications. The rationale behind the division of the SEOs is that previous literature
(e.g Walker and Yost, 2008; Silva and Belinski, 2015) finds that the market tends to react
differently upon the announcement of these. Thus, to identify any illegal insider trading
we find it necessary to look at the different SEO categories in isolation.
In Figure 4 we present the cumulative average abnormal returns for each category.
Consistent with previous literature on agency issues and asymmetric information (Walker
and Yost, 2008), the issuers of SEOs experience negative abnormal returns on average
surrounding the public announcement. The target firms of M&As experience positive
abnormal returns surrounding the announcement date. This is also consistent with
previous M&A research (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981; Sanders and Zdanowicz, 1992).
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Figure 4: Development in CAR over the Event Window
Note: The chart present the cumulative average abnormal returns per deal-type in the window [-25,10].
The four deal-types are M&A and the three SEO-categories Investment, General and Recapitalisation.
The abnormal returns are calculated using the one-factor market model. The alpha and betas are
estimated over 101 trading days in the window [-126,-26]. Stock prices are collected from Børsprosjektet
NHH, where we gather the prices adjusted for corporate events such as dividends and splits.
There seems to be a clear distinction between the different categories as target firms
of M&A transactions experience positive abnormal returns on average, whereas issuers
stating Recapitalisation motives experience negative abnormal returns both prior and
after the public announcement. We observe that the buildup in CAR begins thirteen
days prior to the announcement for M&A, while the development for Recapitalisation
starts at the beginning of the event window, 24 trading days prior. The buildup in CAR
we observe from the Recapitalisation sample can also be caused by other factors than
illegal insider trading. It is reasonable that the stock performance of a firm right before a
restructuring/recapitalisation is worse the last 25 trading days prior to the announcement,
than in the estimation window. This issue will be investigated further in the analysis.
Issuers stating Investment or General motives experience on average positive abnormal
returns prior to the public announcement. However, the abnormal returns shift to negative
upon the public announcement. Earlier research on Investment and General offerings,
suggests that the market will, on average, have a negative reaction to the announcement.
We thus expect an illegal insider trader to short sell the stock rather than to buy it. As we
observe positive abnormal returns prior to the announcement of these types of offerings,
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the illegal insider trading (if any) does not lead the direction of the abnormal return.
Hence, it is difficult to isolate the possible illegal insider trading. The combination of a
positive buildup in CAR prior to the announcement and a subsequent decrease at the
announcement could also indicate a level of market timing, where managers of issuing
firms exploit overvalued equity (Loughran and Ritter, 1995).
Another argument that substantiates the conclusion of lesser illegal insider trading in the
Investment and General offerings, is the risk versus reward aspect from the perspective of
the illegal insider trader. Consistent with previous literature (see Keown and Pinkerton,
1981; Walker and Yost, 2008), our findings suggests that there are possible financial gains
from buying before M&A announcements (|AR| is equal to 15.1 % at announcement day)
and short selling before Recapitalisation announcements (11.5 %). However, the possible
gains from short selling before Investment (1.0 %) and General offering announcements
(0.6 %) is substantially smaller. Thus, the reward for illegal insider traders to invest and
short sell before M&A- and Recapitalisation announcements, respectively, is far greater
than to short sell before the other offering announcements. Meanwhile, the risk an illegal
insider trader is exposed to, following the criminal offense, is more stable for the different
deal categories10. According to economic theory a rational decision-maker is indifferent of
two options where the expected return is the same. However, if an alternative is riskier
than the other and the expected return is still the same, most people prefer the less riskier
alternative (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). If the illegal insider trader can be considered
as a rational decision-maker, the person would prefer to go long before an M&A or short
a Recapitalisation offering. Based on these results, the rest of the paper mainly focus on
Recapitalisation and M&A, as the potential for illegal insider trading seems to be greater
in these categories.
10According to Norwegian legislative history (i.e. the Sense-sentence from 2011) there are other aspects
than possible percentage gain from the illegal insider trade that are more decisive for the sentencing. For
instance, the official position of the offender, level of breach in trust and degree of impulsiveness are some
important criteria.
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Table 2: Abnormal and Cumulative Abnormal return, M&A
M&A
N Day CAR Window
Abnormal Average Returns Cumulative Abnormal returns
AR % t-test Patell Z BMP Wilcox. CAR % t-test Patell Z BMP Wilcox.
129 -13 0.05 0.13 0.35 0.28 0.40 [-13,-13] 0.05 0.13 0.35 -0.13 0.40
129 -12 0.72 1.84⇤⇤⇤ 3.01⇤⇤⇤ 2.07⇤⇤ 0.71 [-13,-12] 0.76 1.45 2.38⇤⇤⇤ 0.40 0.96
129 -11 0.47 1.35 1.14 0.73 0.70 [-13,-11] 1.23 2.18⇤⇤ 2.60⇤⇤⇤ 0.58 1.38
129 -10 0.40 1.21 1.60 1.38 0.52 [-13,-10] 1.63 2.65⇤⇤⇤ 3.05⇤⇤⇤ 0.85 1.73*
129 -9  0.18  0.62  1.45  1.26  1.33 [-13,-9] 1.45 2.18⇤⇤ 2.08⇤⇤ 0.58 1.19
129 -8 0.08 0.28 0.50 0.48  0.25 [-13,-8] 1.53 1.91⇤ 2.10⇤⇤ 0.62 1.03
129 -7 0.64 1.83⇤ 2.35⇤⇤ 1.88⇤ 0.82 [-13,-7] 2.17 2.39⇤⇤⇤ 2.83⇤⇤⇤ 0.99 1.50
129 -6  0.24  0.78  1.21  0.90  0.39 [-13,-6] 1.93 2.02⇤⇤ 2.23⇤⇤ 0.77 1.23
129 -5 0.00 0.00 1.39 1.41 0.39 [-13,-5] 1.93 2.06⇤⇤ 2.56⇤⇤⇤ 0.99 1.28
129 -4 0.59 1.97⇤ 2.54⇤⇤⇤ 1.89⇤⇤ 0.85 [-13,-4] 2.52 2.55⇤⇤⇤ 3.23⇤⇤⇤ 1.35 1.60
129 -3 0.82 2.40⇤⇤⇤ 2.22⇤⇤ 1.90⇤ 0.92 [-13,-3] 3.34 3.24⇤⇤⇤ 3.75⇤⇤⇤ 1.69⇤ 2.08⇤⇤
129 -2 0.46 1.60 1.82⇤ 1.70⇤ 1.00 [-13,-2] 3.80 3.52⇤⇤⇤ 4.12⇤⇤⇤ 1.96⇤ 2.29⇤⇤
129 -1 0.94 3.03⇤⇤⇤ 3.51⇤⇤⇤ 2.84⇤⇤⇤ 2.02⇤⇤ [-13,-1] 4.74 4.10⇤⇤⇤ 4.93⇤⇤⇤ 2.43⇤⇤⇤ 2.52⇤⇤⇤
129 0 15.10 7.60⇤⇤⇤ 67.02⇤⇤⇤ 8.70⇤⇤⇤ 6.01⇤⇤⇤ [-13,0] 19.84 11.52⇤⇤⇤ 22.66⇤⇤⇤ 8.93⇤⇤⇤ 6.41⇤⇤⇤
129 1 1.23 2.88⇤⇤⇤ 4.75⇤⇤⇤ 2.84⇤⇤⇤ 1.73⇤ [-13,1] 21.07 12.33⇤⇤⇤ 23.12⇤⇤⇤ 9.49⇤⇤⇤ 6.55⇤⇤⇤
Note: The table presents the abnormal- and cumulative average abnormal returns for the 129 M&A
observations from 13 trading days prior to the announcement to 1 trading day post-announcement
[-13,1]. We include a t-test, Patell Z test, BMP test and Wilcoxon rank test for both the abnormal- and
cumulative average abnormal returns to investigate whether the different returns are equal to zero. *, **
and *** denote test-statistics significant at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively. Please see Appendix A1 for
calculation of the different test-statistics.
As we see from Table 2, the CAR for M&A starts to take on abnormal characteristics in
the days before the official public announcement. Furthermore, we observe a large spike
in the average abnormal return of 15.10 % on day 0, suggesting that the announcement
generally came as a surprise to the market. The cumulative average abnormal return for
the M&As becomes positive 12 days prior to the announcement. In addition, the daily
average abnormal return is positive in 11 out of 13 days prior to the announcement. From
the different tests presented in Table 2, we extract that for both the t-test and the Patell
Z-test, the CAR is significantly different from zero in the 11 and 12 days prior to the
announcement, while from the BMP- and the Wilcoxon rank sum test we observe that the
last three days is significantly different from zero. The BMP-test is robust to the variance
induced by the event, and explains the difference in significance between the tests. The
significant pre-announcement buildup in CAR gives us reason to believe that there might
exist illegal insider trading. However, compared to existing literature on illegal insider
trading upon merger announcements, the buildup in CAR of 4.74 % is relatively small.
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Keown and Pinkerton (1981) and King (2009) found that approximately half and 39 % of
the build up in CAR occurs prior to the announcement date respectively, we find this
number to be 24 %.
Overall, our results from the M&A sample indicate that there might exist trading based
on private information as some of the previous literature on M&As (see Keown and
Pinkerton, 1981) has interpreted significant pre-announcement buildup in CAR as prima
facie evidence of illegal insider trading. However, there may be other explanations for
why the returns take on abnormal characteristics prior to the announcement, which will
be discussed in the subsequent sections.
Table 3: Abnormal- and Cumulative Abnormal Returns, SEO
Panel A: Abnormal Returns
Day
Investment N=131 General N=74 Recapitalisation N=71
AR (%) t-test Patell Z BMP Wilcox. AR (%) t-test Patell Z BMP Wilcox. AR (%) t-test Patell Z BMP Wilcox.
-25  0.28  0.92 0.03 0.03  0.40 1.55 1.58 2.26⇤⇤ 1.17 0.43  1.43  1.62  2.63⇤⇤⇤  2.21⇤⇤  1.14
-24 0.27 0.82 0.29 0.27  0.65  0.17  0.30  0.46  0.35  0.21 1.10 1.49 2.09⇤⇤ 1.53 0.74
-23 0.36 1.27 0.77 0.75  0.21 0.72 1.15 0.89 0.85 0.21  0.11  0.23  0.36  0.42  0.15
-22 0.36 1.23 1.54 1.33 0.32 0.82 1.81⇤ 1.92⇤ 2.17⇤⇤ 1.34  1.02  1.54  2.23⇤⇤  1.99⇤  1.30
-21  0.32  1.32  1.10  1.26  1.08 0.39 0.85 0.30 0.34  0.14  0.41  0.77  1.04  1.06  0.15
-20 0.21 0.94 0.86 0.96 0.26 0.60 1.09 2.31⇤⇤ 1.41 0.59  0.25  0.33  0.49  0.39  0.46
-19 0.21 0.91 0.62 0.75 0.70 0.28 0.73  0.07  0.08  0.26 0.67 0.92 1.40 1.10 0.63
-18 0.05 0.17 0.48 0.44 0.16 0.07 0.17  0.51  0.37 0.49  0.67  0.66  0.92  0.72 0.52
-17  0.21  0.78  0.53  0.54  0.46 0.28 0.75 0.92 1.11 0.55  0.90  1.05  2.38⇤⇤⇤  1.08  0.74
-16  0.33  1.00  0.75  0.65  0.33 0.14 0.27  0.45  0.28 0.74  0.28  0.45  0.10  0.09  0.14
-15 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.08  0.52 0.91 1.80⇤ 1.20 1.18 0.54 0.07 0.12  0.18  0.17 0.67
-14  0.22  0.74  0.80  0.78  0.27  0.51  1.35  1.32  1.67⇤  1.38 0.50 0.48 0.53 0.46  0.22
-13 0.18 0.51 0.33 0.30  0.78 0.58 1.25 1.06 1.06 1.30  0.32  0.32  0.34  0.18  1.01
-12  0.06  0.15 0.79 0.45 0.14  0.55  1.44  0.84  0.65  1.43  1.16  1.48  1.62  1.25  0.66
-11 1.02 2.27⇤⇤ 3.20⇤⇤⇤ 2.26⇤⇤ 1.02  0.56  1.39  1.35  1.34  1.38  0.33  0.37  1.45  0.84  0.22
-10  0.26  0.53  1.88⇤  1.28  1.37 0.17 0.52 0.58 0.74 0.44  0.40  0.66  1.46  1.26  0.84
-9 0.52 1.81⇤ 2.53⇤⇤⇤ 2.39⇤⇤⇤ 1.31 0.08 0.20  0.33  0.32  0.44  0.35  0.70  0.73  0.72  0.40
-8 0.53 1.03 0.94 0.71  0.01 1.03 1.91⇤ 2.08⇤⇤ 1.91⇤ 1.32  0.88  1.21  1.97⇤  1.38  0.94
-7 0.32 0.70 2.08⇤⇤ 1.32 0.73 0.47 0.77 0.65 0.54 0.33  0.29  0.44  0.41  0.30  0.74
-6 0.14 0.43 0.41 0.37  0.21 0.07 0.15  0.22  0.22 0.02 0.11 0.18 0.00 0.00  0.28
-5 0.62 1.54 2.43⇤⇤⇤ 1.57 0.80 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.10 0.34  0.46  0.80  0.55  0.50  0.49
-4  0.27  1.00  1.03  1.04  0.81 0.04 0.07 0.20 0.15 0.42  0.29  0.35  1.02  0.59  0.57
-3 0.56 1.52 2.32⇤⇤ 2.00⇤⇤ 1.15  0.37  0.80  1.18  0.86  0.52  0.64  0.91  1.14  0.71  1.25
-2 0.10 0.36  0.12  0.12  0.37 0.23 0.71 0.30 0.41 0.46  1.44  1.52  2.67⇤⇤⇤  1.33  0.91
-1 0.49 1.78⇤ 1.94⇤ 1.92⇤ 1.36 0.20 0.43 0.46 0.42  0.52 0.09 0.11 0.88 0.55  0.17
0 0.97 0.75 1.59 0.32  0.24  0.64  0.59  3.06⇤⇤⇤  1.23  0.82  11.55  3.38⇤⇤⇤  26.91⇤⇤⇤  3.30⇤⇤⇤  2.37⇤⇤
1  2.54  3.46⇤⇤⇤  10.23⇤⇤⇤  3.71⇤⇤⇤  2.48⇤⇤⇤  3.56  3.85⇤⇤⇤  9.26⇤⇤⇤  4.72⇤⇤⇤  2.89⇤⇤⇤  2.49  1.14  3.03⇤⇤⇤  0.61  0.83
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Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Event window
Investment N=131 General N=74 Recapitalisation N=71
CAR (%) t-test Patell Z BMP Wilcox. CAR (%) t-test Patell Z BMP Wilcox. CAR (%) t-test Patell Z BMP Wilcox.
[-25,-25]  0.28  0.88 0.03 0.08  0.40 1.55 1.58 2.26⇤⇤ 1.12 0.43  1.43  2.93⇤⇤⇤  2.63⇤⇤⇤  2.24⇤⇤  1.14
[-25,-24]  0.01 0.02 0.23 0.28  0.37 1.38 1.62 1.27 1.03  0.03  0.32  0.61  0.38  0.35 0.02
[-25,-23] 0.35 0.79 0.63 0.67  0.03 2.10 1.70⇤ 1.55 1.26 0.32  0.43  0.57  0.52  0.49  0.29
[-25,-22] 0.71 1.39 1.32 1.32 0.25 2.91 2.28⇤⇤ 2.31⇤⇤ 2.13⇤⇤ 1.05  1.45  1.81⇤  1.56  1.39  1.16
[-25,-21] 0.38 0.64 0.69 0.66 0.03 3.30 2.24⇤⇤ 2.20⇤⇤ 2.00⇤⇤ 1.04  1.86  2.11⇤⇤  1.86⇤  1.69⇤  1.21
[-25,-20] 0.59 0.90 0.98 0.95 0.49 3.90 2.59⇤⇤⇤ 2.95⇤⇤⇤ 2.63⇤⇤⇤ 1.35  2.12  2.25⇤⇤  1.90⇤  1.70⇤  1.35
[-25,-19] 0.80 1.21 1.14 1.19 0.79 4.18 2.53⇤⇤⇤ 2.71⇤⇤⇤ 2.35⇤⇤ 1.21  1.44  1.53  1.23  1.31  0.73
[-25,-18] 0.85 1.05 1.23 1.14 0.67 4.26 2.64⇤⇤⇤ 2.35⇤⇤ 2.07⇤⇤ 1.42  2.11  2.07⇤⇤  1.48  1.54  0.91
[-25,-17] 0.65 0.79 0.99 0.91 0.48 4.54 2.81⇤⇤⇤ 2.52⇤⇤⇤ 2.21⇤⇤ 1.52  3.01  2.67⇤⇤⇤  2.19⇤⇤  2.33⇤⇤  1.08
[-25,-16] 0.32 0.37 0.70 0.65 0.36 4.68 2.83⇤⇤⇤ 2.25⇤⇤ 1.96⇤ 1.58  3.29  2.75⇤⇤⇤  2.11⇤⇤  2.39⇤⇤⇤  1.04
[-25,-15] 0.33 0.35 0.69 0.63 0.31 5.59 2.88⇤⇤⇤ 2.51⇤⇤⇤ 2.10⇤⇤ 1.64  3.22  2.22⇤⇤  2.07⇤⇤  2.20⇤⇤  0.97
[-25,-14] 0.11 0.12 0.43 0.39 0.16 5.08 2.54⇤⇤⇤ 2.02⇤⇤ 1.76⇤ 1.12  2.72  1.79⇤  1.82⇤  2.09⇤⇤  0.91
[-25,-13] 0.30 0.28 0.51 0.45 0.26 5.66 2.72⇤⇤⇤ 2.24⇤⇤ 1.99⇤ 1.50  3.04  2.04⇤⇤  1.85⇤  1.85⇤  1.04
[-25,-12] 0.24 0.20 0.70 0.59 0.38 5.11 2.40⇤⇤⇤ 1.93⇤ 1.80⇤ 1.14  4.21  2.32⇤⇤  2.21⇤⇤  2.21⇤⇤  1.37
[-25,-11] 1.26 0.92 1.50 1.27 0.88 4.55 2.08⇤⇤ 1.52 1.39 0.83  4.54  2.17⇤⇤  2.51⇤⇤⇤  2.26⇤⇤  1.29
[-25,-10] 1.00 0.64 0.98 0.77 0.35 4.72 2.14⇤⇤ 1.61 1.54 0.84  4.94  1.91⇤  2.80⇤⇤⇤  2.35⇤⇤  1.22
[-25,-9] 1.52 0.98 1.57 1.29 0.73 4.81 2.10⇤⇤ 1.49 1.37 0.86  5.29  2.08⇤⇤  2.89⇤⇤⇤  2.46⇤⇤⇤  1.38
[-25,-8] 2.04 1.29 1.75⇤ 1.38 0.63 5.84 2.56⇤⇤⇤ 1.93⇤ 1.87⇤ 1.20  6.17  2.53⇤⇤⇤  3.27⇤⇤⇤  2.46⇤⇤⇤  1.41
[-25,-7] 2.37 1.45 2.18⇤⇤ 1.71⇤ 0.82 6.31 2.51⇤⇤⇤ 2.03⇤⇤ 1.83⇤ 1.29  6.46  2.53⇤⇤⇤  3.28⇤⇤⇤  2.35⇤⇤  1.23
[-25,-6] 2.51 1.53 2.21⇤⇤ 1.78⇤ 1.07 6.38 2.41⇤⇤⇤ 1.93⇤ 1.69⇤ 1.25  6.35  2.49⇤⇤⇤  3.20⇤⇤⇤  2.20⇤⇤  1.21
[-25,-5] 3.13 1.85⇤ 2.69⇤⇤⇤ 2.19⇤⇤ 1.23 6.43 2.25⇤⇤ 1.92⇤ 1.55 1.35  6.81  2.60⇤⇤⇤  3.24⇤⇤⇤  2.41⇤⇤⇤  1.35
[-25,-4] 2.85 1.65 2.41⇤⇤⇤ 1.96⇤ 1.10 6.47 2.05⇤⇤ 1.92⇤ 1.54 1.37  7.11  2.60⇤⇤⇤  3.39⇤⇤⇤  2.26⇤⇤  1.55
[-25,-3] 3.41 1.86⇤ 2.84⇤⇤ 2.23⇤⇤ 1.18 6.11 1.91⇤ 1.63 1.28 1.37  7.74  2.77⇤⇤⇤  3.55⇤⇤⇤  2.35⇤⇤  1.66
[-25,-2] 3.51 1.96⇤ 2.76⇤⇤⇤ 2.22⇤⇤ 1.21 6.34 1.96⇤ 1.66 1.33 1.30  9.19  3.04⇤⇤⇤  4.02⇤⇤⇤  2.69⇤⇤⇤  1.66
[-25,-1] 4.00 2.14⇤⇤ 3.09⇤⇤⇤ 2.43⇤⇤⇤ 1.24 6.53 1.96⇤ 1.71⇤ 1.35 1.29  9.10  2.95⇤⇤⇤  3.76⇤⇤⇤  2.60⇤⇤⇤  1.52
[-25,0] 4.98 2.08⇤⇤ 3.34⇤⇤⇤ 2.03⇤⇤ 1.33 5.89 1.68⇤ 1.08 0.79 0.83  20.64  4.16⇤⇤⇤  8.97⇤⇤⇤  3.76⇤⇤⇤  2.64⇤⇤⇤
[-25,1] 2.44 1.05 1.31 0.82 0.40 2.33 0.67  0.72  0.54  0.10  23.14  4.66⇤⇤⇤  9.38⇤⇤⇤  4.11⇤⇤⇤  2.76⇤⇤⇤
Note: The table presents the abnormal- and cumulative average abnormal returns for the 3 categories Investments, General & Recapitalisation
in the event window [-25,1]. Panel A describes the average abnormal returns with corresponding test-statistics, while Panel B describes the
cumulative average abnormal returns. We include a t-test, Patell Z test, BMP test and Wilcoxon rank test for both the abnormal- and
cumulative average abnormal returns to investigate whether the different returns are equal to zero. *, ** and *** denote test-statistics
significant at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively. Please see Appendix A for calculation of the different test-statistics.
From Panel B in Table 3, we observe that the pre-announcement buildup in CAR for
the Investment- and General samples, are significantly different from zero. Following the
discussion from the first part of the analysis, we conclude that the significant buildup in
CAR are likely to be caused by other factors than illegal insider trading. Consequently,
we will not look further into these offerings.
However, we will investigate the Recapitalisation offerings further, as our results indicate a
potential for illegal insider trading in this category. Similar to the M&A sample, we observe
a substantial negative average abnormal return of -11.55 % for the Recapitalisation sample
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at announcement date. Similar to the M&A sample, this suggests that the announcement
generally came as a surprise to the market. Nevertheless, approximately half (-9.10 %) of
the total decrease (-20.64 %) in CAR occurs prior to the announcement. The development
in CAR is even greater than what we observe from the M&A sample in absolute terms.
Furthermore, we observe that the CARs are consistently negative in the 18 days prior to
the announcement. The different statistical tests on CAR suggests that the development
is no coincidence, as the t-test, patell Z test and the BMP test imply that CAR is
different from zero 17 days prior to announcement. These findings might suggest that
there is a degree of illegal insider trading prior to recapitalisation motivated SEOs. There
might, however, be other factors that explain the negative development in CAR for the
Recapitalisation sample, which we investigate further in the subsequent sections.
For robustness of the results in this section, we also calculate the abnormal returns
based on the Fama-French 3-factor model (see Appendix A5). Consistent with Kothari
and Warner (2006), this does not substantially influence our results. They argue that
short-term event studies are largely immune to misspecification in estimating abnormal
returns.
5.2 Abnormal Trading Volume
As we observe in the previous section, the buildup in CAR prior to the announcement for
the M&A are relatively small compared to previous research. Gao and Oler (2004) argues
that significant buy (sell) side transactions of illegal insiders could be offset by significant
sell (buy) side transactions from uninformed investors, as these investors interpret increase
(decrease) in share price as over (under) valuation of the stock. This will result in a
relatively steady share price. However, if the aforementioned occurrence is true then
we should also experience significant abnormal trading volume prior to the significant
abnormal returns. From Table 4 we do not observe such a lag in significant abnormal
returns that could substantiate the statements from Gao and Oler (2004) for the M&As.
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Table 4: Abnormal- return and volume, M&A
Day N M&A - Abnormal Returns & Abnormal Volumes
AR AR t-Score CAR CAR t-Score AV AV t-Score
-13 129 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.99
-12 129 0.72 1.84⇤ 0.76 1.45 0.23 1.89⇤
-11 129 0.47 1.35 1.23 2.19⇤⇤ 0.25 2.16⇤⇤
-10 129 0.40 1.22 1.63 2.65⇤⇤⇤ 0.18 1.68⇤
-9 129  0.18  0.62 1.45 2.18⇤⇤ 0.08 0.65
-8 129 0.08 0.28 1.53 1.91⇤ 0.20 1.68⇤
-7 129 0.64 1.83⇤ 2.17 2.39⇤⇤⇤ 0.13 1.04
-6 129  0.24  0.78 1.93 2.02⇤⇤ 0.07 0.61
-5 129 0.00 0.00 1.93 2.06⇤⇤ 0.19 1.63
-4 129 0.59 1.97⇤ 2.52 2.55⇤⇤⇤ 0.13 1.10
-3 129 0.82 2.40⇤⇤⇤ 3.34 3.24⇤⇤⇤ 0.34 3.04⇤⇤⇤
-2 129 0.46 1.60 3.80 3.52⇤⇤⇤ 0.26 2.05⇤⇤
-1 129 0.94 3.03⇤⇤⇤ 4.74 4.10⇤⇤⇤ 0.39 3.34⇤⇤⇤
0 129 15.10 7.60⇤⇤⇤ 19.84 11.52⇤⇤⇤ 3.01 16.69⇤⇤⇤
Note: This table provides the average abnormal returns, cumulative average abnormal returns
and average abnormal volume with corresponding t-test statistics for the M&A sample.
Average abnormal volume is the difference between daily trading volume and the average
trading volume of the same firm over the estimation period [-126,-26]. These abnormal
volumes are averaged across firms. *, **, and *** denote test-statistics significant at 10 %, 5
% and 1 % respectively.
When we look at the Recapitalisation category in Table 5 we observe that there are several
days of significant abnormal trading volume prior to significant abnormal returns. Gao
and Oler (2004) argues that this lag between abnormal returns and abnormal volume can
be interpreted as the effect of illegal insider trading.
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Table 5: Abnormal- return and volume, Recapitalisation
Day N Recapitalisation - Abnormal Returns & Abnormal volumes
AR AR t-Score CAR CAR t-Score AV AV t-Score
-25 71  1.43  1.62  1.43  2.93⇤⇤⇤ 0.04 0.25
-24 71 1.10 1.50  0.32  0.61 0.32 2.32⇤⇤
-23 71  0.11  0.23  0.43  0.57 0.35 2.50⇤⇤⇤
-22 71  1.02  1.54  1.45  1.81⇤ 0.17 1.16
-21 71  0.41  0.77  1.86  2.11⇤⇤ 0.39 2.64⇤⇤⇤
-20 71  0.25  0.33  2.12  2.25⇤⇤ 0.14 0.91
-19 71 0.67 0.92  1.44  1.53 0.25 1.68⇤
-18 71  0.67  0.66  2.11  2.07⇤⇤ 0.15 0.99
-17 71  0.90  1.05  3.01  2.67⇤⇤⇤  0.04 -0.26
-16 71  0.28  0.45  3.29  2.75⇤⇤⇤ 0.12 0.84
-15 71 0.07 0.12  3.22  2.22⇤⇤ 0.27 2.06⇤⇤
-14 71 0.50 0.48  2.72  1.78⇤ 0.17 1.22
-13 71  0.32  0.32  3.04  1.88⇤ 0.44 2.37⇤⇤⇤
-12 71  1.16  1.48  4.21  2.22⇤⇤ 0.16 0.94
-11 71  0.33  0.37  4.54  2.07⇤⇤ 0.15 0.88
-10 71  0.40  0.66  4.94  1.85⇤ 0.21 1.42
-9 71  0.35  0.70  5.29  1.99⇤⇤ 0.15 1.00
-8 71  0.88  1.21  6.17  2.42⇤⇤⇤ 0.22 1.38
-7 71  0.29  0.44  6.46  2.46⇤⇤⇤ 0.27 1.58
-6 71 0.11 0.18  6.35  2.42⇤⇤⇤ 0.27 1.73⇤
-5 71  0.46  0.80  6.81  2.54⇤⇤⇤ 0.35 2.201⇤⇤
-4 71  0.29  0.35  7.11  2.54⇤⇤⇤ 0.17 1.11
-3 71  0.64  0.91  7.74  2.73⇤⇤⇤ 0.43 3.28⇤⇤⇤
-2 71  1.44  1.52  9.19  3.03⇤⇤⇤ 0.45 2.95⇤⇤⇤
-1 71 0.09 0.11  9.10  2.96⇤⇤⇤ 0.40 2.60⇤⇤⇤
0 71  11.55  3.38⇤⇤⇤  20.64  4.29⇤⇤⇤ 1.14 5.34⇤⇤⇤
Note: This table provides the average abnormal returns, cumulative average abnormal returns and
average abnormal volume with corresponding t-test statistics for the Recapitalisation sample. Average
abnormal volume is the difference between daily trading volume and the average trading volume of the
same firm over the estimation period [-126,-26]. These abnormal volumes are averaged across firms. *, **
and *** denote test-statistics significant at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively.
As mentioned, Gao and Oler (2004) argues that the existence of abnormal volume prior
to an announcement can indicate a degree of illegal insider trading. This is further
supported by Keown and Pinkerton (1981) who suggest that surges in volumes prior to an
announcement might indicate illegal insider trading. However Jarrell and Poulsen (1989)
claims that abnormal volume indicates a level of rumors. Since the literature is somewhat
inconsistent as to how to interpret this measure, we introduce Google search volume as a
new measure of investor attention. Rumors about an upcoming event will undoubtedly
attract search attention on Google. Moreover, a single investor with private information
can account for significant amount of a potential abnormal trading volume, whereas a
single person will not have the same effect on Google search volume. Consequently, we
believe this measure will isolate the rumor effect in a more accurate way.
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5.3 Abnormal Google Search
Following Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), we argue that a buildup in CAR prior to an
announcement cannot in itself provide evidence of illegal insider trading. There can
be many justifications for such a buildup that needs be accounted for. The existence
of rumors and market anticipation before an upcoming event is one factor that can
contribute to a pre-announcement buildup in CAR. Existing literature have mainly used
media speculation as a measure of these factors (see Jarrell Paulson, 1989; Sanders
Zdanowics, 1993). In this paper, however, we use Google search frequency as a direct
measure of investor attention, to distinguish illegal insider trading from rumors and
market anticipation. Da et al. (2013) argues that a search on a stock on Google is a
revealed attention measure. If rumors about an upcoming merger or seasoned equity
offering circulate, then it will undoubtedly attract investor attention. Hence, we can use
this information to isolate events where there has been an abnormal number of search,
indicating the existence of rumors and/or market anticipation.
We obtain Google search volume data on a total of 90 M&As and 63 Recapitalisations.
These are divided into two subsets by the median abnormal search volume. Furthermore,
CAR is calculated for each of the four sub-samples. The results are presented in Table 6.
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Table 6: CAR split by Search volume














-25  2.50  0.84  2.06⇤⇤
-24  0.49  1.00 0.64
-23  0.63  0.76 0.28
-22  2.04  1.96 0.09
-21  2.28  2.29 0.11
-20  0.99  3.06 1.18
-19  0.68  1.70 0.62
-18  2.22  1.85  0.09
-17  4.07  2.15  0.87
-16  4.99  2.40  1.21
-15  4.83  2.53  0.91
-14  3.28  2.81  0.12
-13  0.18 0.08  0.39  3.98  2.29  0.44
-12 0.09 0.03 0.07  4.65  2.93  0.46
-11 0.41 0.16 0.24  5.62  3.33  0.62
-10 0.79 0.18 0.50  5.84  3.55  0.61
-9 0.43  0.13 0.44  5.99  3.84  0.55
-8 0.56  0.45 0.71  6.20  4.65  0.37
-7 1.77 0.02 1.01  6.95  4.91  0.48
-6 2.12  1.00 1.65  5.72  5.54 0.01
-5 2.07  0.66 1.51  6.36  5.76  0.10
-4 2.55  0.53 1.73⇤  5.57  6.31 0.23
-3 3.51  0.23 1.96⇤  5.80  7.75 0.51
-2 3.93 0.05 2.02⇤⇤  6.19  10.15 0.93
-1 4.27 0.92 1.58  6.16  9.46 0.78
0 20.90 17.72 0.71  15.37  25.97 1.36
Note: In this table, we investigate the full Google Trends sample consisting of 90 M&A
observations and 63 Recapitalisations. We divide each sample into two sub-samples consisting
of the firms with the highest- and lowest ASVI, split by the median observation. We compare
the CAR development between the sub-samples. For comparison, we add a two sample t-test
to test if the two sub-samples in each category are equal to each other. The M&A-sample
starts at 13 trading days prior to the announcement as the interesting development in CAR
starts at this point. Similarly, we include 25 trading days prior to the announcement for the
Recapitalisation sample.
As we observe, the buildup in CAR is almost entirely driven by companies with a high
abnormal search volume prior to the public announcement of the M&A. This result
indicates that the buildup in CAR for M&As is a result of market anticipation or rumors
of a possible M&A. A two-sample t-test also displays that the CAR, for the different
samples are significantly different from each other. In addition, a one sample t-test on the
low ASVI sample shows that the CARs are not significantly different from zero. These
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findings are interesting because they suggest that there is not systematic illegal insider
trading prior to M&A announcements on OSE, in contrast to several previous studies on
other markets (see Keown and Pinkerton, 1981; Jain and Sunderman, 2014).
When we look at the buildup in CAR for the Recapitalisation sub-samples we observe the
opposite effect. The buildup in CAR is larger for the firms with a low search volume prior
to the announcement. The t-statistic shows, however, that the CARs are not significantly
different from each other. This result indicates that the buildup in CAR may not be
driven by rumors, but in fact illegal insider trading.
However, Barber and Odean (2008) and Da et al. (2011) find that stocks with an increase
in ASVI are associated with an outperformance in stock returns. Barber and Odean
(2008) uses the argument that individual investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing
securities. The reasoning behind this is that when investors are buying stock they can
choose from a pool of alternatives. However, when they are selling, they tend to sell only
stocks they already own. Following this argumentation, we would expect a smaller effect
of our attention measure on Recapitalisation than on M&A.
Like Da et al. (2011), we find some of the searches as noisy. This occurs when the abnormal
search volume (ASVI) can be explained by other factors than investor attention. Some
examples of such noisy observations are searches on Norwegian Air Shuttle, XXL and
Komplett, where the purpose of the search is likely to be related to other factors than the
stock. For example a search on Norwegian Air Shuttle is likely to be related to customers
wanting to buy flight tickets, and the search volume will be correlated with travelling
seasons rather than investor attention. These observations bring noise to the data and
may cause biased results. We manually go through all the companies in the sample and
flag these observations. For robustness, we repeat the abovementioned exercise with data
were noisy observations are excluded. After removing the noisy observations, we are left
with 78 and 59 observations for the M&A and Recapitalisation sample, respectively. A
list of the noisy company observations is found in Appendix A4. The results from the
filtered samples are presented in Table 7 below.
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Table 7: CAR split by Search volume, ex. noisy observations














-25  2.34  0.88  0.73
-24 0.07  0.97 0.42
-23 0.09  0.69 0.31
-22  0.74  1.90 0.48
-21  1.23  2.21 0.35
-20 0.18  3.08 1.06
-19 0.63  1.51 0.78
-18  1.05  1.61 0.18
-17  3.31  1.81  0.44
-16  5.11  2.15  0.81
-15  4.81  2.30  0.62
-14  3.20  2.49  0.19
-13  0.13 0.04  0.24  4.09  1.86  0.49
-12  0.05 0.14  0.19  4.92  2.54  0.51
-11 0.42 0.09 0.28  6.09  2.94  0.57
-10 0.90 0.23 0.48  6.27  3.23  0.52
-9 0.51  0.06 0.40  6.44  3.54  0.47
-8 0.81  0.56 0.85  6.77  4.29  0.36
-7 2.31  0.05 1.21  7.75  4.68  0.41
-6 2.78  1.08 1.81⇤  6.84  5.50  0.17
-5 2.44  0.53 1.45  8.23  5.78  0.34
-4 3.02  0.71 1.84⇤  9.03  6.34  0.36
-3 4.09  0.27 2.04⇤⇤  9.06  7.07  0.26
-2 4.76 0.17 2.15⇤⇤  8.84  9.69 0.11
-1 5.26 0.91 1.87⇤  8.63  8.92 0.04
0 19.78 20.11  0.07  15.85  25.14 0.82
Note: The table presents the development in cumulative abnormal returns for the Google
Trends sample after removing noisy observations for both M&As and Recapitalisations. There
are 78 M&As and 59 Recapitalisations left in the samples when noisy observations are excluded.
We divide each sample into two sub-samples consisting of the firms with the highest- and
lowest ASVI, split on the median observation. We compare the CAR development between
the sub-samples. For comparison, we add a two sample t-test to test if the two sub-samples in
each category are equal to each other. The M&A-sample starts at 13 trading days prior to
the announcement as the interesting development in CAR starts at this point. Similarly, we
include 25 trading days prior to the announcement for the Recapitalisation sample.
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Figure 5: CAR-development for sub-samples excluded noisy observation
Note: The chart shows the development in CAR for the two sub-samples with High- and Low ASVI in
the M&A sample. Furthermore, noisy observations are removed. On the x-axis, we include the trading
days prior to the announcement date in the interval [-13,-1].
As we see from the Table 7 and Figure 5, the difference in CAR between the high- and
low ASVI samples become even clearer for the M&As when we remove noisy observations.
This further substantiates our previous findings on the M&A sample and indicates that
the abnormal returns may not be driven by illegal insider trading. For the Recapitalisation
category, the results remain similar to the ones found when investigating the whole Google
Search sample, thus indicating that the pre-announcement CAR is driven by other factors
than rumors. One of these factors could be illegal insider trading.
To summarize our findings from the first parts of the analysis, we have presented results
indicating that there is a low degree of illegal insider trading for the offerings categorized
as Investments and General. The conclusion is drawn from the fact that the CAR is
surging prior to the announcement for both samples, while the opposite development is
seen in the CAR. after the announcement day. There still might exist some degree of
illegal insider trading, however the possible criminal offence is not decisive for the direction
of the share price development.
Furthermore, we have looked at different rumor indicators such as abnormal trading volume
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and abnormal search volume, collected from Google Trends. The latter indicator suggests
that the build-up in CAR before M&A announcements stem from rumors. Following the
net buying hypothesis presented by Barber and Odean (2007), further discussed by Da
et al. (2011), it is reasonable that we do not observe the same difference in CAR between
high- and low ASVI in the Recapitalisation sample. We therefore conclude differently
in the two subsets in this section. Consequently, we provide two different angles on the
cross-sectional analysis for the two subsets M&A and Recapitalisation in the following
section.
5.4 Cross-Sectional Analysis
In this section, we present results from cross-sectional regression analysis on CAR in
the M&A- and Recapitalisation samples. We want to check whether other variables than
illegal insider trading can explain the variation in CAR between the different events.
Also, we are interested in looking at how much of the variation in CAR a Google Trend
binary variable can explain and how this variable is affected when including multiple other
independent variables. Noisy observations are excluded in this variable. We will focus
most on the latter in the M&A regressions given the results from the previous section.
It should be mentioned that these types of cross-sectional regressions usually have a low
explanatory power, at below 10 % (Eckbo et al., 2007).
We split the regressions into two different tables, where Table 8 and Table 9 present
regressions for the M&A and Recapitalisation samples respectively. The dependent variable
is the cumulative abnormal return for the different firms in the event period (-13,-1) for the
M&A sample and (-25,-1) for the Recapitalisation sample. We include different firm- and
deal specific variables, and present coefficient estimates from equation 12 in addition to
the corresponding standard errors. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity
and clustering. Following MacKinlay (1997) and Silva and Bilinski (2015), we adjust for
clustering across the firm dimension as the residuals might be correlated. A problem of
multicollinearity can arise if there is high correlation between the explanatory variables
(Woolridge, 2016). As the correlation between the different explanatory variables is low
(see Appendix A3), we do not deem this a substantial problem for our cross-sectional
analysis. In all M&A regression models we add indicator variables for year and industry,
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to account for yearly- and industry fixed effects (FE), while these are included in 4 out of
5 regressions on the Recapitalistion sample.
5.4.1 M&A Regression Analysis
We will now address the explanatory variables that are included in the different M&A
regression models. The aim of the regressions performed on the M&A sample is to; 1)
investigate whether the binary variable High ASVI is significantly different from zero when
including more explanatory variables and 2) to look at other variables that might explain
some of the pre-announcement build-up in CAR. In Model (1), we only include the binary
indicator for abnormal search volume, where Low ASVI is the omitted variable. In model
(2) we include deal specific characteristics as explanatory variables, such as number of
bidders on the target firm, domestic versus international acquirer and relative target deal
size. The two former variables are binary, that take the value 1 if there are more than one
bidder on the target firm, and if the acquirer is foreign respectively. The relative target
deal size is a continuous variable that can take values in the interval [0.05,1] (see section
3.1). We add the natural logarithm of market capitalization and book-to-market ratio in
Model (3) to also control for valuation factors of the target firm. Lastly, we include target
financial characteristics that control for leverage and profitability of the firm. We provide
explanation for the selection of our explanatory variables in the Section 4.4.1.
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Table 8: Cross-Sectional Regression for M&A
Dependent variable: CAR(-13,-1) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
High abnormal search 0.119*** 0.114*** 0.123*** 0.115**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Multiple bidders -0.037 -0.013 -0.004
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
For. Acquirer -0.054 -0.046 -0.059
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Rel. Deal-Size 0.056 0.018 0.021
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)










Constant -0.055 -0.028 0.192 0.208
(0.10) (0.11) (0.30) (0.29)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.465 0.482 0.529 0.550
adj. R2 0.247 0.228 0.258 0.243
N 77 77 75 75
Note: This table presents the results from the cross-sectional analysis done on the M&A
sample. The dependent variable is the cumulative average abnormal returns measured
over a 13 day period prior to the annoouncement of the M&As. We elaborate on the
reason for inclusion of the explanatory variables in Section 4.4.1. We report explanatory
variable coefficient and corresponding standard errors adjusted for heteroscedastisity
and clustering. All 4 models include yearly- and industry fixed effects. Moreover, *, **
and *** denote test-statistics significant at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively.
The main insight we obtain from Model (1) is that the CAR of the firms with high
abnormal search volume, is significantly different from zero when accounting for fixed
effects. This finding supports the conclusion drawn in the previous section, where we
found, without considering fixed effects, that there was a significant difference in CAR
between high- and low ASVI observations. The adjusted R-squared is 0.247 in Model (1),
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implying that the model explains some of the variation in CAR.
From Model (2) we still observe that the indicator variable high ASVI is statistically
significant at a 1 % significance level. All the deal specific variables are insignificant, and
they seem to add noise to the regression model as the adjusted R-squared decreases.
The key takeaways from Model (3) is that by adding both the target market capitalization
and book-to-market ratio, the model performs better at explaining the variation in CAR.
This is mainly due to the book-to-market variable, which is significant at a 5 % level. The
coefficient is negative, implying that target firms with low book-to-market ratios (growth
firms) have higher abnormal returns than high book-to-market target firms (value firms)
in the event period. This is inconsistent with findings of Jain and Sunderman (2014) who
found the opposite effect.
In model (4) we add the financial characteristics of the target firm to control for
pre-announcement profitability and leverage. The high ASVI binary variable remains
significant, however no longer at a 1 % significance level. Also, the significance of the
book-to-market ratio falls. The added variables seem to add noise to Model (3) as we
observe that the explanatory power of the model decreases.
The most noteworthy findings from the cross-sectional regression on the M&A sample is
that the High ASVI variable remains significant, although we include other variables in
the regression. This is consistent with our findings in Section 5.3. Based on the results
from the regression models, we find no evidence of illegal insider trading regarding the
M&A sample.
5.4.2 Recapitalisation Regression Analysis
In the Recapitalisation cross-sectional regression, our main objective is to explore whether
there are any other variables that explain the negative development in CAR for the
Recapitalisations in the event window (-25,-1). In model (1) we only include the high
abnormal search indicator for robustness to the results found in Section 5.1. We exclude
FE in this model for the interpretation of the constant term. In model (2) we add a
binary variable for flotation-method and a continuous variable for relative deal size. The
binary variable Accelerated take the value 1 if the flotation-method is executed as a private
placement. In model (3) we add the natural logarithm to the valuation metrics market
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capitalization and book-to-market. The next model include all variables including stock
turnover, financial characteristics, and yearly- and industry fixed effects. In model (5) we
zoom in on the financial characteristics.
Table 9: Cross-Sectional Regression for Recapitalisation
Dependent variable: CAR(-25,-1) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
High abnormal search 0.005 0.049 0.059 0.037 0.070
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Accelerated -0.081 -0.074 -0.023
(0.13) (0.08) (0.07)
Rel. Deal-Size -0.003 0.007 0.008
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)










Constant -0.091* 0.365 0.212 0.290 0.205*
(0.05) (0.32) (0.24) (0.37) (0.12)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.000 0.336 0.459 0.708 0.589
adj. R2 -0.017 -0.081 -0.061 0.214 0.241
N 59 58 50 44 49
Note: This table presents the results from the cross-sectional analysis done on the Recapitalisation-sample .
The dependent variable is the cumulative average abnormal returns measured over a 15 day period prior to the
announcement of the Recapitalisations. We elaborate on the reason for inclusion of the explanatory variables
in Section 4.4.1. We report explanatory variable coefficient and corresponding standard errors adjusted for
heteroscedastisity and clustering. 4 of 5 models include yearly- and industry fixed effects. Moreover, *, ** and
*** denote test-statistics significant at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively.
In Model (1), we observe results consistent to what we found in the previous section: The
binary ASVI-variable explains close to nothing of the increase in CAR as the R-squared
equals 0.000. We have not included fixed effects at this point on purpose for interpretation
of the constant coefficient. The constant expresses that when looking at the observations
with low ASVI, the CAR is equal to -9.1 % on average, consistent with the results from
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Table 7. The constant is also significant at a 10 % level.
When we add the binary variable Accelerated and Relative deal size in model (2), all
explanatory variables are insignificant and the model explains close to nothing of the
variation in CAR. In model (3) we add both market capitalization and book-to-market
ratio of the issuer. The inclusion of these variables does not improve the explanatory
power of the model.
In model (4) we add all the our explanatory variable, including yearly- and industry fixed
effects. The adjusted R-squared has increased to 21.4 %, implying a stronger model than
model (3). The financial characteristics Leverage and ROA are significant. Consequently,
we want to look closer at these variable as they seem to be the most important factors in
explaining the pre-announcement buildup in CAR.
When only adding the ASVI term, ROA and Leverage in model (5), we observe that
both the ROA and Leverage is significant at a 5 % level. The R-squared has increased
to 24.1 %. The results from model (5) are important. These findings suggest that the
financial characteristics of the firm are important factors explaining the plunge in CAR
prior to the announcement. From an intuitive perspective it adds up, as one would expect
sophisticated investors to monitor their calculations on the probability of an emergency
offering and act accordingly. The event window we use is fairly wide (-25,-1). 25 trading
days include on average 38 regular days in the Recapitalisation sample. From a manual
search we find observations where the quarterly numbers are released in the event window,
which is intuitive as quarterly results are released approximately every 90 days. It is
reason to believe that the release of quarterly results in an event window prior to a
Recapitalisation will on average have an unfavourable impact on abnormal returns, as the
company might release new negative information or shed light on the financial situation
of the firm. However, we cannot reject that illegal insider trading explains some of the
development in CAR as the regression model only explains 24.1% of the variation in




In this thesis we examine the illegal insider trading activity prior to M&A- and SEO
announcements on Oslo Stock Exchange. Using a sample of 405 successful M&A- and
SEO transactions between 2000 and 2019, we apply the Event-study methodology, as
described by MacKinlay (1997), to calculate CAR prior to the public announcements of
these deals. A significant buildup in CAR prior to a public announcement indicates a
degree of illegal insider trading, provided that information about the upcoming transaction
is not anticipated by the market. We introduce ex ante stated intended use of proceeds
as a differentiation variable to distinguish between different SEOs, as existing literature
finds that the market reaction is dependent on the stated motivation behind the offering
(see Autore et al. 2009; Silva and Belinski, 2013).
Our initial results suggests that there could be a degree of illegal insider trading prior
to M&A announcements, with a significant CAR of 4,7 % during an event window
stretching from 13 trading days- to 1 trading day prior to the public announcement
(-13,-1). However, this result is relatively small compared to similar research on other
markets (e.g Keown and Pinkerton, 1981; King, 2009). Subsequently we find that SEOs,
categorized as Recapitalisations, experience approximately half of the total decrease in
CAR prior to the public announcement. This might indicate a level of short selling by
informed insiders before the information is available to the market. SEOs categorized as
either General or Investment do experience a significant positive buildup in CAR prior
to public announcements. However, the market reacts in the opposite direction upon
disclosure of the transaction. As the ARs move in the opposite direction of what we would
expect with substantial illegal insider trading prior to the announcement, our main focus
for the rest of the analysis is M&A and Recapitalisation.
Although some existing literature interpret significant buildup in CAR as de facto evidence
of illegal insider trading, we add Google search volume as a proxy for investor attention.
We can thus identify events where there have been abnormal search volumes, indicating
information leakage. For the M&A category, our findings demonstrate that there is a
significant difference in CAR between firms with high - and low search volume. Firms
with a low degree of abnormal search experience a pre-announcement CAR close to zero.
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These results suggests that the pre-announcement runup in CAR for the M&As are
largely driven by rumors and/or market anticipation. However, when we apply the same
methodology to the Recapitalisation events, we do not find a significant difference between
high- and low search volume firms. As discussed in the analysis section, this can either
be explained by the net buying hypothesis presented by Barber and Odean (2008) or it
could in fact indicate illegal insider trading.
Moreover, we investigate whether there are other deal- or firm specific variables that
may explain the pre-announcement buildups in CAR for M&A and Recapitalisations
respectively. Through our cross-sectional regression analysis, we find that search volume
is consistently significant in the M&A sample even when we control for other deal- and
firm specific variables. This is consistent with our previous findings that the runup can be
largely explained by market anticipation and rumors. Also consistent with our previous
findings we observe that the coefficient for search volume is not significant when we run
the cross-sectional regression on the Recapitalisations. The most interesting results from
the Recapitalisation regressions is that Leverage and ROA seems to explain much of
the variation in CAR. This means that the financial situation of the firms can explain
some of the variations in CAR. This is reasonable considering the financial distress a
firm experience prior to a recapitalisation motivated offering. However, the explanatory
power of the regression model is relatively low. In addition, a substantial part of the total
decrease in CAR occurs prior to the public announcement. Thus we cannot exclude the
possibility of systematic illegal insider trading in the Recapitalisation sample.
Although we do not provide clear evidence of illegal insider trading, our findings indicate
that this might be the case prior to announcement of SEOs with recapitalisation motives.
However, inconsistent with literature on foreign markets, our findings suggest that illegal
insider trading prior to M&A announcements might not be a substantial problem on OSE.
We believe this thesis provides an important contribution to previous research as we
employ Google search volume as a direct measure of investor attention. To the best of
our knowledge this has not been done in this context before. Our results indicate that
the Recapitalisation offerings have the most potential to attract illegal insider trading.
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In order to investigate if there is any illegal insider trading prior to the different deal
announcements, we apply significance testing. It is important that the test results are
robust, especially as we base our second part of the analysis on the yielded results from
the inferences. MacKinlay (1997) split the significance tests into two main categories:
parametric- and non-parametric tests. Parametric tests are characterized as tests with
specific assumptions about the distribution of abnormal returns, while in the non-
parametric tests there are no such assumptions. These non-parametric tests are typically
not performed in isolation but in conjunction with the parametric ones for robustness
(MacKinlay, 1997).
We first test if the ARs and CARs in the subgroups M&A, Investment, General and
Recpaitalisation are equal to zero, following the approach of and MacKinlay (1997).
To build upon the t-tests, we perform statistical inferences on AR and CAR with a
standardization of the test, based on the work of Patell (1976). A further development
of the test is introduced by Boehmer et al. (1991). This test (BMP) is robust to the
event-induced variance. Following MacKinlay (1997), we will supplement with the non-
parametric Wilcoxon Rank test.
A1.1 Cross-sectional t-test
Following MacKinlay (1997) we want to test if the CAR are significantly different from
zero. To perform statistical inference on CAR under the assumption of no overlap in the
event window of the different observations, we employ a two-sided cross-sectional t-test
with the following statistical features (MacKinlay, 1997):
CAR(⌧1, ⌧2) ⇠ N [0, var(CAR(⌧1, ⌧2))] (15)
The residual variance  2✏ needed to compute the variance of the AR and thus the variance
of the CAR following the relationship between var(AR) and var(CAR) in equation 16
A1 Statistical Tests 49











Patell (1976) states that the residual variance  2✏ from the market model regression, where
we found the ↵ and  , is unbiased. MacKinlay (1997) further propose these residual
variances as an appropriate estimator for the residual variance in equation 17. We use this
estimator to compute the variance of (AR) and (CAR) from equation 16 and equation




⇠ N(0, 1) (18)




⇠ N(0, 1) (19)
The distributional results are asymptotic with respect to both the number of securities
N and the length of our estimation window (MacKinlay, 1997). This is generally not a
problem for event studies as the convergence to asymptotic distributions is rather quick for
the test statistics (MacKinlay, 1997). In our study, we use a large N and our estimation
window is 101 trading days.
A1.2 Patell test
MacKinlay (1997) also refers to the Patell test as a common modification to the test
mentioned above. The approach of Patell (1976) standardize each ARi by dividing the
ARi with the forecast-error corrected standard deviation. Such standardization can lead
to more powerful tests (MacKinlay, 1997).





Where the SARi,t is the standardized abnormal return and SARi,t is the standard deviation
of the abnormal returns in the estimation window from the test of MacKinlay (1997).
Patell (1976) adjust the standard error by the forecast error, as the event-window ARs are
out-of-sample predictions. The formula for the forecast-error corrected standard deviation














Where S2ARi denotes the unadjusted standard error, Mi denotes the length of the estimation
window, while Rm,t and Rm denotes the market return at time=t in the estimation window
and mean of the market return in the estimation window, respectively.











Mi 4 , where Mi denotes the length of the
estimation window.









Where CSARi is the cumulative SARi,t during the event window. S2CSARi is calculated
using S2CSARi = L2
Mi 2
Mi 4 , where L2 denotes the length of the event window.
A1.3 Standardized Cross-sectional test (BMP)
Boehmer et al (1991) further proposed a standardized cross-sectional test that is robust
for event-induced variance. They conclude that other tests result in rejection of the null
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hypothesis too frequently (Boehmer et al., 1991), as the event might cause significant
variance uptick in the event-observations. Boehmer et al. (1991) introduce this test as
an extension of the traditional cross-sectional test, including elements from the above-
mentioned Patell test. The proposed test include data from both the estimation window
and the event window, and the researchers argue that this test is more robust than
previous methods as it is sufficient even though there is volatility induced by the event
(Boehmer et al., 1991).













(SARi,t   SARt)2 (25)







Where the SCAR is the standardized cumulative abnormal return for each event, while
the SCARi is the average SCARi for all i.
A1.4 Non-parametric tests
We also include a non-parametric test to supplement the other tests and ensure robustness.
The Wilcoxon rank test acts as a supplement to the conventional t-test. The test considers
both the size and the magnitude of the abnormal returns. It further assumes that none of





Where rank(ARi,t) is the rank of the absolute value of ARi,t. The test statistic is further
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calculated as follows:
zwilcoxon,t =
W  N(N   1)/4p
(N(N + 1)(2N + 1)/12)
(28)
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46 Scatec Solar 13.06.2018 Investment
The net proceeds from the
Private Placement will be
used to accelerate growth,
including near term
equity investments in
large scale solar projects,
beyond the 1.1 GW currently
under construction.
129 Opera Software 26.06.2014 Investment
The purpose of the placement
is to strengthen the Company￿s
capital base for current and future
strategic
acquisition activities
157 ScanaIndustrier 29.01.2013 General
The net proceeds to the Company
from the Private Placement will be
used for strengthening of the balance
sheet and general corporate purposes.
216 Codfarmers 24.06.2010 General
The net proceeds from the
Private Placement and the
Havlandet Share Issue will be
used for biomass growth and
general corporate purposes.
247 KongsbergAutomotive 01.09.2009 Recapitalisation
Through the successful
completion of the private
placement Kongsberg Automotive
has reached an important milestone
in the restructuring of the company
282 SongaOffshore 16.10.2008 Recapitalisation
The purpose of the private
placement is to finance the
Company’s short term liquidity
requirements, including debt
repayment, cash calls from total
return swaps and increase in
Company’s cash holdings.
Note: The table presents examples of the ex ante stated intended use of proceeds.
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High Abn. Search 1.000
Multiple Bidders 0.043 1.000
Foreign Acquirer 0.076  0.109 1.000
Rel. Deal-Size 0.094 0.173 0.242 1.000
Ln(MCap) 0.110  0.019  0.141 0.064 1.000
Ln(B2M) 0.129 0.040 0.074  0.257 -0.334 1.000
Ln(Turnover) 0.179 0.031 0.024 0.085 0.210  0.181 1.000
Leverage 0.125 0.076  0.030  0.067 -0.002 0.029 0.128 1.000
ROA  0.027 0.103  0.211 0.025 0.391  0.241  0.047 0.039 1.000
Note: The table presents a correlation matrix of the explanatory variables from the cross-sectional regression on M&A pre-
announcement CAR in the interval [-13,-1]
















High Abn. Search 1.000
Accelerated  0.009 1.000
Rel. Deal-Size 0.089  0.005 1.000
Ln(MCap) 0.130 0.123  0.301 1.000
Ln(B2M)  0.100 0.123 0.202  0.086 1.000
Ln(Turnover) 0.051 0.225  0.048 0.320 0.122 1.000
Leverage 0.058 0.136 0.161  0.018 0.182 0.050 1.000
ROA 0.209 0.043  0.306 0.276  0.144 0.014  0.128 1.000
Note: The table presents a correlation matrix of the explanatory variables from the cross-sectional regression on
Recapitalisation pre-announcement [-25,-1].
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Note: The table provides an overview of the companies
evaluated as noisy. There are 9- and 3 unique companies
removed in the M&A- and Recapitalisation sample,
respectively. A total of 12 and 4 observations are
removed in the two samples as some of the companies
are included more than once.
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A5 One-Factor Model Versus Fama-French Three-
Factor model


























-25 0.05 -0.06 0.29 -25 -0.28 -0.33 0.11
-24 -0.39 -0.41 0.03 -24 0.27 0.33 -0.11
-23 -0.07 -0.21 0.30 -23 0.36 0.26 0.24
-22 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -22 0.36 0.31 0.12
-21 -0.32 -0.50 0.36 -21 -0.32 -0.33 0.00
-20 -0.22 -0.13 -0.22 -20 0.21 0.16 0.18
-19 -0.14 -0.14 0.00 -19 0.21 0.16 0.14
-18 0.34 0.25 0.24 -18 0.05 0.11 -0.13
-17 0.18 0.00 0.46 -17 -0.21 -0.23 0.05
-16 -0.05 -0.13 0.19 -16 -0.33 -0.31 -0.04
-15 0.58 0.59 -0.02 -15 0.02 0.02 -0.01
-14 -0.49 -0.49 0.00 -14 -0.22 -0.19 -0.06
-13 0.05 -0.02 0.12 -13 0.18 0.07 0.24
-12 0.72 0.72 -0.01 -12 -0.06 -0.14 0.13
-11 0.47 0.39 0.16 -11 1.02 1.05 -0.04
-10 0.40 0.49 -0.19 -10 -0.26 -0.23 -0.05
-9 -0.18 -0.13 -0.12 -9 0.52 0.51 0.02
-8 0.08 -0.02 0.26 -8 0.53 0.55 -0.03
-7 0.64 0.61 0.07 -7 0.32 0.27 0.08
-6 -0.24 -0.23 -0.04 -6 0.14 0.09 0.10
-5 0.00 0.04 -0.11 -5 0.62 0.74 -0.22
-4 0.59 0.43 0.38 -4 -0.27 -0.26 -0.02
-3 0.82 0.79 0.05 -3 0.56 0.46 0.20
-2 0.46 0.44 0.05 -2 0.10 0.13 -0.07
-1 0.94 0.86 0.20 -1 0.49 0.49 0.01
0 15.10 15.08 0.01 0 0.97 0.82 0.08
1 1.23 1.18 0.08 1 -2.54 -2.50 -0.03
Note: The table provides a comparison of average abnormal returns using the One-factor- and the Fama-French 3-
Factor Model for the M&A and Investment samples. There is also provided a two-sample t-statistic to check if the
difference between the average abnormal returns equal zero.
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-25 1.55 1.58 -0.02 -25 -1.43 -1.59 0.13
-24 -0.17 -0.11 -0.07 -24 1.10 1.08 0.02
-23 0.72 0.75 -0.04 -23 -0.11 0.06 -0.24
-22 0.82 0.82 -0.01 -22 -1.02 -1.00 -0.02
-21 0.39 0.50 -0.17 -21 -0.41 -0.22 -0.24
-20 0.60 0.47 0.17 -20 -0.25 -0.20 -0.05
-19 0.28 0.21 0.12 -19 0.67 0.67 0.00
-18 0.07 0.07 0.01 -18 -0.67 -0.69 0.02
-17 0.28 0.21 0.12 -17 -0.90 -0.85 -0.05
-16 0.14 0.08 0.07 -16 -0.28 -0.39 0.12
-15 0.91 0.87 0.06 -15 0.07 0.09 -0.02
-14 -0.51 -0.58 0.14 -14 0.50 0.39 0.08
-13 0.58 0.64 -0.09 -13 -0.32 -0.15 -0.12
-12 -0.55 -0.53 -0.03 -12 -1.16 -1.32 0.14
-11 -0.56 -0.44 -0.22 -11 -0.33 -0.28 -0.04
-10 0.17 0.26 -0.19 -10 -0.40 -0.36 -0.04
-9 0.08 0.15 -0.11 -9 -0.35 -0.32 -0.03
-8 1.03 0.98 0.07 -8 -0.88 -0.86 -0.02
-7 0.47 0.59 -0.14 -7 -0.29 -0.45 0.17
-6 0.07 0.02 0.08 -6 0.11 0.24 -0.15
-5 0.05 -0.06 0.11 -5 -0.46 -0.34 -0.15
-4 0.04 0.11 -0.08 -4 -0.29 -0.25 -0.04
-3 -0.37 -0.37 0.00 -3 -0.64 -0.96 0.34
-2 0.23 0.15 0.18 -2 -1.44 -1.26 -0.14
-1 0.20 0.24 -0.06 -1 0.09 0.12 -0.03
0 -0.64 -0.74 0.06 0 -11.55 -11.66 0.02
1 -3.56 -3.60 0.03 1 -2.49 -2.49 0.00
Note: The table provides a comparison of average abnormal returns using the One-factor- and the Fama-French 3-
Factor Model for the General and Recapitalisation samples. There is also provided a two-sample t-statistic to check if
the difference between the average abnomal returns equal zero.
